Seminar Details
2011-02-10 (16.30) : COLLOQUIUM CESAME/MAPA: Public Goods, Free Riders and the Emergence of Sanctions
At CYCL01
Organized by Mathematical Engineering
Speaker :
Karl SIGMUND (University of Vienna, Austria)
Abstract :
Punishment of free-riders is generally viewed as an important factor in promoting cooperation. But since it is often costly to sanction
exploiters, the emergence of such a behavior and its stability raise interesting problems. Players who do not contribute to the sanctions, but profit from
the increased level of cooperation caused by them, act as 'second-order exploiters' and threaten the joint enterprise. In this paper, we review the role
of voluntary participation in establishing and upholding cooperation with or without punishment. In particular, we deal with two distinct forms of
punishment, namely peer punishment and pool punishment, and compare their stability and their efficiency. The emergence and upkeep of collaborative
undertakings can strongly depend on whether participation is voluntary or mandatory. The possibility to opt out of a joint enterprise often helps
in curbing exploiters and boosting pro-social behavior.